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A TALE OF TWO CONTINENTS: ENVIRONMENTAL 
MANAGEMENT-BASED REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION AND THE UNITED STATES 
BY 
RACHELE. DEMING* 
Many enviromnental issues, such as addressing climate change 
and encouraging sustainability, have transcended existing statutozy 
schemes, causing regulators and scholars to evaluate alternative 
regulatozy mechanisms. One area of focus has been the potential for 
using enviromnent;al management systems (EMSs) as a way to leverage 
govemment;al regulation of operations that impact the enviromnent An 
EMS is a systematic planning, implementation and review process that 
organizations use to continuously improve enviromnent;al perfonnance. 
While there is some literature on the impact that regulations 
incorporating EMSs have had, almost nothing has been written from a 
comparative viewpoint. This Article analyzes what role EMSs have 
played in governmental regulation by comparing two of the most 
prominent govemment;al programs based on EMSs: The European 
Commission's Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) and the 
United States Enviromnent;al Protection Agency's Perfonnance Track 
program. This comparison is especially useful because govemment;al 
regulators in the European Union and the United States took opposite 
approaches with respect to those programs. The European Union 
continues to develop and promote EMAS while the United States 
withdrew its Perfonnance Track program in 2009. The Article 
concludes that there is strong potential for EMS-based regulations to 
produce significant enviromnent;al perfonnance and compliance 
benefits, and that more should be done in the United States to evaluate 
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lessons learned from Perfonnance Track as well as EMAS 
developments. Some the of major beneiits, such as risk management, 
avoidance of negative incidents and extemal engagement, are hard to 
quantify but could provide the basis for transfonning cUITent 
adversarial relationships among regulated facilities, regulators and 
other stakeholders into more productive collaborative govemance 
relationships. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since 1990, Congress has not been able to pass any legislation that 
addresses the current and emerging global environmental concerns. 1 Most 
I See Gregg Easterbrook, Opinion, Let's Modemize Our Pollution Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 
2015, at A31 ("Our major environmental laws are a generation or more out of date - written for 
conditions of the past, not the present. The Clean Air Act, signed by President Richard M. Nixon 
in 1970, has not been amended since 1990, a quarter-century ago. The Clean Water Act, passed 
in 1972, has not been updated since 1987. The Endangered Species Act, passed in 1973, was last 
amended in 1982. The National Environmental Policy Act, the law that mandates environmental 
impact statements, was passed in 1970 and last amended in 1982."); Michael P. Vandenbergh, 
Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 131 (2013) (hereinafter 
Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance] ("Yet no major federal environmental statute 
has been enacted since the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. The period of statutory inaction 
(1991-2012) now exceeds the period of statutory growth (1970-1990)."). In fact, legislative 
efforts at the federal level have been blocked. See, e.g., Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhom, 
Democrats Call Off Climate Bill in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2010, at Al5 ("The effort to 
advance a major climate change bill through the Senate this summer collapsed."); Editorial, 
G.O.P. Assault on Environmental Laws, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2015, at A20 ("President Obama has 
announced or will soon propose important protections for clean water, clean air, threatened 
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environmental control legislation in the United States date back to the 1970s: 
the National Environmental Policy Act;2 the Clean Air Act;3 the Clean Water 
Act;4 the Safe Drinking Water Act;5 and the Solid Waste Disposal Act,6 which 
became the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act7 (RCRA) when it was 
amended in 1976. The last major piece of legislation imposing federal control 
was the enactment of the Clean Air Amendments of 1990.8 The three statutes 
that are focused on controlling pollution from industrial operations, the 
Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and RCRA, primarily establish 
command-and-control rules for plants and facilities,9 and their purpose was 
to establish national baselines for emissions, discharges, and waste 
species and threatened landscapes. Mitch McConnell, the Senate majority leader, and other 
Republicans in Congress are trying hard not to let that happen .... "). 
2 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370h (2012)). 
3 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2012)). 
4 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 
816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2012)). 
5 Safe Drinking Water Act, Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (1974) (codified as. amended at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (2012)). 
6 Solid Waste Disposal Act, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992 (1965). 
7 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2012)) (amending the Solid Waste Disposal 
Act, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992 (1965)). 
8 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399. See also David W. 
Case, The Lost Generation: EnviromnenW Regulatory Refonn in the Era of Congressional 
Abdication, 25 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL 'y F. 49 (2014) [hereinafter Case, Lost Generation]. 
President Obama did sign recently the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st 
Century Act, Pub. L. No. 114-182, 130 Stat. 448 (2016) (amending the Toxic Substances Control 
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2012)). The Toxic Substances Control Act legislation, however, 
focuses on disclosure and reporting requirements rather than controlling operations. Prior to 
that law, the· only other significant environmental law enacted on the federal level since the 
1990 Clean Air Amendments actually decreased federal control over operations by exempting 
fracking operations from many of the requirements under the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water 
Act, the Sate Drinking Water Act and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-9675 (2012). Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. 
L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified as amended. primarily in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. 
(2012)). See Editorial, The Halliburton Loophole, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2009, at A28 (discussing 
the so-called "Halliburton Loophole" contained in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which took 
away federal environmental jurisdiction over hydraulic fracturing operations). 
9 See SCOTT HASSELL ET AL., RAND CORP., AN AsSESSMENT OF THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AGENCY'S NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE TRACK PROGRAM 5--6 (2010), 
available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2010/RAND_TR732 
.pdf [hereinafter RAND ASSESSMENT]. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 did introduce 
some market incentives into the regulatory scheme. Id at 6; see also Case, Lost Generation, 
supra note 8, at 77-78 ("[S]tudies by economists have shown that public disclosure of negative 
environmental information by companies can motivate them to improve their future 
environmental performance. These studies suggest that, in theory, post-disclosure pressures 
brought to bear by economic markets and public opinion create market incentives that 
positively affect the behavior of environmental actors."(footnote omitted)). 
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management in order to address impacts that cross state boundaries.10 
Congress assigned the United States Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) the responsibility to implement and enforce those provisions." These 
laws and EPA's compliance and enforcement efforts have made a significant 
impact on the quality of the environment in the United States. 12 These laws 
did not, however, empower EPA or any other federal agency to require 
environmental stewardship or to incentivize improvements beyond 
compliance with applicable statutes.13 
As a result of these statutory and regulatory voids, some scholars and 
regulators have focused on the ability of voluntary regulation to address 
current environmental concerns. 14 Two of the most well-lmown and prolific 
authors writing about voluntary regulation, Cary Coglianese and Jennifer 
Nash, observed, "[w]ith only remote prospects for statutory and regulatory 
solutions to environmental concerns about global warming and exposure to 
toxic substances, among other things, voluntary approaches are one of the 
few means through which government is currently able to respond. "15 
An environmental management system (EMS) is a systematic planning, 
implementation, and review process that organizations use to continuously 
improve environmental performance.16 The importance of EMSs as a well-
recognized environmental management tool is demonstrated by the 
widespread use and steady increase in implementation of EMSs by facilities 
10 See, e.g., JAMES E. MCCARTHY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30853, CLEAN AIR ACT: A 
SUMMARY OF THE ACT AND ITS MAJOR REQUIREMENTS 12 (2011) (noting that establishing a 
consistent baseline for pollution control is a goal of the Clean Air Act accomplished by New 
Source Performance Standards); Michael P. Healy, Still Dirty After Twenty-Five Years: Water 
Quality Standard Enforcement and the Availability of Citizen Suits, 24 ECOWGY L.Q. 393, 397 
(1997) ("The regulatory scheme adopted in 1972 sought to improve water quality primarily by 
limiting discharges into regulated waters."); Ali Abazari & Meredith Morse, Development, Solid 
Waste, 45 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 135, 137 (2015). ("RCRA establishes a federal regulatory structure 
that governs the treatment and disposal of 'hazardous wastes,' which are defined as a subset of 
'solid waste' for waste management purposes."). 
11 MCCARTHY ET AL., supra note 10, at 1 ("The authorities and responsibilities of [EPA] 
derive primarily from a dozen major environmental statutes."). 
12 RAND AsSESSMENT, supra note 9, at 6; see also Case, Lost Generation, supra note 8, at 61 
(noting that the environmental protection statutes from the 1960s and 1970s are "credited with 
substantial, albeit insufficient success in reducing pollution and improving environmental 
quality in many ways"). 
13 RAND AsSESSMENT, supra note 9 at 5-6; see also McCARTHY ET AL., supra note 10, at 16 
("Like most federal environmental statutes, the Clean Air Act is enforced primarily by states or 
local governments; they issue most permits, monitor compliance, and conduct the majority of 
inspections. The federal government functions as a backstop, with authority to review state 
actions."). 
14 E.g., RAND AsSESSMENT, supra note 9, at 77-82; Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, 
Perfonnance Track's Postmortem: Lessons From the Rise and Fall of EPA's "Flagship" 
Volunt;azy Program, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 10 (2014) [hereinafter Coglianese & Nash, 
Perfonnance Track's Postmortem]. 
15 Coglianese & Nash, Perfonnance Track's Postmortem, supra note 14, at 10. 
16 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
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and organizations throughout the world. 11 The major outlier to this 
worldwide trend is the United States; EPA shut down an experimental 
program designed to encourage the implementation of EMSs in facilities in 
the United States. 18 In contrast, the European Commission has made its 
EMS-based program a cornerstone of its environmental regulations, and also 
touts its own participation in that program as leadership-by-example to 
improve the environment. 19 An analysis of these two management-based 
regulatory programs is particularly timely in light of the management-based 
approach included in the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change,20 and a 
parallel focus by corporate counsel on compliance and regulatory issues as 
their top two concerns. 21 Because management systems such as an EMS 
employ an integrated and interdisciplinary approach to operations and 
compliance,22 they also provide a proven framework for compliance 
17 0RG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., ENSURING ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE: TRENDS 
AND GOOD PRACTICES 94-96 (2009) [hereinafter OECD, ENSURING ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE]. 
18 Coglianese & Nash, Perfonnance Track's Postmortem, supra note 14, at 8; see also 
Memorandum from Lisa P. Jackson, Adm'r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Performance Track 
Members, Performance Track Corp. Leaders, and State Envtl. Comm'rs (Mar. 16, 2009), 
available at http://archive.epa.gov/performancetrack/web/pdf/ptclosure_memo_ckent.pdf 
(halting Performance Track Program, thanking memo recipients for their participation, and 
making plans for next steps). 
19 See Eur'. Comm'n Directorate-General, About Us, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/environment/ 
index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2016); Eur. Comm'n, EMAS in the European Institutions, 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/emas/emas_registrations/emas_in_the_european_institutions_ 
en.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2016) ("The European Commission was the first EU Institution to 
become registered with EMAS. Other EU institutions are also responding to the challenge of 
taking responsibility for their environmental impacts. The European Commission EMAS team 
members are proud and honored to have served sometimes as 'mentors' to their colleagues in 
setting up the scheme in other institutions - 'Walking the talk', as we say!"). EMAS as an 
environmental program of the European Union is an appropriate level of governance to 
compare to Performance Track. The European Union "functions as a form of federal 
government" and has "nearly unrestricted authority to legislate" in environmental protection 
matters. Roger Martella & Glory Francke, Federalism in European Environment;aJ Decision 
Making, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Summer 2012, at 8, 8 (ABA Section of Environment, Energy 
and Resources). 
20 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris 
Agreement, Draft Decision CP.21, GE.15-21932(E), FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.l (Dec. 12, 2015), 
https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/109.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2016) (requesting 
the Parties to the Paris Agreement enhance understanding, action and support with respect to 
loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change through a 
comprehensive risk assessment and management); see also Cary Coglianese, Opinion, When 
Management-Based Regulation Goes Global, REGBLOG, Dec. 23, 2015, http://www.regblog.org/ 
2015/12/23/coglianese-when-management-based-regulation-goes-global (last visited Nov. 19, 
2016) (explaining how the Paris Agreement has management-based regulation at its core and 
identifying the pros and cons to this approach). 
21 Sue Reisinger, Survey: GCs Report an 'Astounding' Rise in Regulatozy Risk, CORP. 
COUNS., Jan. 27, 2016, http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=l202748157588/Survey-GCs-Report-an-
Astounding-Rise-in-Regulatory-Risk?slreturn=20160108124628 (last visited Nov. 19, 2016). 
22 Andrew Brengle, Proving the Value of Environment;aJ Management Systems, 26 FLETCHER 
F. WORLD AFF. 205, 206-07 (2002). 
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programs,23 and U.S. regulators should reevaluate their potential benefit in 
the United States. 
Accordingly, this Article explores the relationship between govemment-
sponsored programs based on EMSs and their potential to spur 
improvements in environmental performance in the absence of legislation, 
as well as to provide a tool for ensuring better compliance. The Article 
accomplishes this through a comparative analysis of the use of EMSs as a 
regulatory tool in the European Union and the United States. While there 
have been other articles and studies addressing the topic of the regulatory 
value of EMSs, very few have done them on a comparative basis;2' and none 
of them have compared the studies evaluating the effectiveness of the 
European Union's Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) and EPA's 
Performance Track program. This comparison is especially timely with the 
release of a new and comprehensive evaluation of EMAS,25 which as an 
environmental program of all members of the European Union, is an 
appropriate level of governance to compare to Performance Track 
Part II describes what EMSs are, how they operate, and why they are 
important in a global context. Part III discusses how the European Union 
has utilized EMSs as the base of EMAS, and how EMAS has developed over 
its 20 years of existence. It also describes how U.S. federal regulators 
promoted the use of EMSs during the Clinton and Bush presidencies through 
an initiative that evolved into the Performance Track program, but then 
reversed that policy and suspended Performance Track at the .beginning of 
the Obama administration. Part IV evaluates the literature on the claimed 
impact each of these programs has had on environmental performance and 
compliance. The EU studies have examined a wider range of environmental 
performance impacts, while the U.S. studies have focused on the delivery of 
23 Id at 205, 207. 
24 Ariel Meyerstein, Transnational Private Financial Regulation and Sustainable 
Development: An Empirical Assessment of the Implementation of the Equator Principles, 45 
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 487, 533 (2013). 
25 See Fabio Iraldo, Presentation on the Policy Case for EMAS: Why Public Bodies Should 
Promote Voluntary Environmental Measures in Companies at the High Level Conference on 
EMAS (Nov. 13, 2015) [hereinafter Iraldo Presentation], available at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
environment/emas/pdf/pdf_and_images_HLC _Site/Presentations!Fabio_Iraldo. pdf (last visited 
Nov. 19, 2016). This presentation was based on a study, Supporting the Evaluation of the 
Implementation of the EU Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) Regulations 122112009, 
Service Contract No. 070307/2013/667137/SER/ENV.Al, commissioned by the Directorate-
General of the European Commission (DG Environment). The study is currently under review 
by DG Environment. E-mail from Sebastien Paquot, EMAS Policy Officer, Directorate-Gen. for 
the Env't, Eur. Comm'n, to Rachel E. Deming, Assistant Professor, Barry Univ. Dwayne 0. 
Andreas Sch. Of Law (Dec. 7, 2016) (on file with author). The authors of the study have been 
publishing some of the results in journals. See, e.g., Francesco Testa et al., Public Regulatory 
Relief and the Adoption of Environmental Management Systems: A European Survey, 59 J. 
ENVI'L. PLAN. & MGMT. 2231 (2016); Tiberio Daddi et al., Exploring the Link Between 
Institutional Pressures and Environmental Management Systems Effectiveness: An Empirical 
Study, 183J. ENVI'L. MGMT. 647 (2016). 
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measurable benefits and compliance.26 Part V discusses the relative merits of 
two regulatory approaches and suggests possibilities for further research. 
The Article concludes that the Europe Union's EMAS program demonstrates 
the potential EMS-based regulations have to produce significant 
environmental performance and compliance benefits, and that the United 
States and other nations could benefit from finding ways to utilize EMSs for 
transforming national governmental environmental regulation from 
enforcing a set of baseline rules for compliance to instigating actions that 
improve our global environment. 
IL AN EMS PRIMER 
EMSs are used in over 170 countries around the globe. 27 The emergence 
of EMSs coincided with the exploration of transforming regulatory systems 
from governmental command-and-control policies to more flexible regimes 
that allow private actors a greater range of options to meet governmental 
requirements.28 At the same time, the laws of individual nation-states have 
become just one of several considerations operating entities must take into 
account to compete in an increasingly global marketplace.29 
26 See infra Part IV. 
27 Indep. Int'l Org. for Certification, Environmental Management ISO 14001, http://www. 
iioc.org/environmental-management-iso-14001 (last visited Nov. 19, 2016) ("Organisations 
certified to ISO 14001 in over· 170 countries is testament to the leading management system in 
the sustainability field."). 
28 Lesley K. McAllister, Harnessing Private Regulation, 3 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 291, 
326-28 (2014). 
Private regulation is often viewed as an alternative to public regulation. It tends to 
develop where there are gaps in public regulation. Private environmental governance has 
thrived in the United States, for example, in the absence of significant new legislation. 
Gaps may also be present because existing governmental institutions cannot reach 
certain activity. Economic globalization has been an important driver of private 
regulation because governmental actors lack sufficient authority to regulate against 
many of the negative social externalities of international econ.omic activity. 
Id. at 293 (footnotes omitted). "Oft-cited advantages of private regulation include the proximity 
of the regulator to the regulated activity, the flexibility of the regulatory process, greater 
compliance, and additional regulatory resources." Id. at 316; see also Tseming Yang & Robert V. 
Percival, The Emergence of Global Environmental Law, 36 ECOWGY L.Q. 615, 640 (2009) 
("Adoption of ISO standards has encouraged convergence in corporate behavior worldwide. 
ISO standards and certification are reinforcing the idea within multinational corporations that 
use of uniform operating standards and practices with respect to pollution, worker safety, and 
other matters may ultimately be cheaper and more efficient than the maintenance of multiple 
standards or practices, even when applicable regulatory standards vary across the countries in 
which the multinational corporations operate. The voluntary adoption of privately promulgated 
international standards by businesses worldwide has driven convergence of corporate behavior 
and correspondingly the expectations and norms of the public and government officials."). 
29 For example, the Toxic Substances Control Act requires the production of health and 
environmental studies from parent and affiliates, even if located outside the United States. U.S. 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INSTRUCTION MANUAL FOR REPORTING UNDER THE TSCA § 5 NEW 
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EMSs provide an internationally recognized standard for evaluating 
environmental processes.30 In addition, they have been suggested as a tool 
for providing a more uniform global approach to environmental governance31 
as well as leveraging the capabilities of constrained environmental 
enforcement agencies, something particularly important for developing 
nations.32 Despite their widespread prevalence, EMSs are not often 
mentioned in standard legal textbooks on environmental law,33 and many 
legal practitioners and scholars may not be familiar with them. However,. as 
described below, they are an increasingly important mechanism in 
worldwide environmental governance, compliance programs, and supply 
chains. 34 Therefore, it is important to understand what they are, how they 
work, and how they interact with regulations and compliance. 
A. What Is an EMS? 
An EMS is a globally recognized tool for evaluating and improving 
environmental performance.35 The process underlying an EMS is the 
establishment of a management system for production that was originally 
CHEMICALS PROGRAM 17 (2015), available at http://www.epa.gov/sites/ 
production/files/2015-06/documents/instruction_manual_2015_5-26-2015.pdf. 
30 See Yang & Percival, supra note 28, at 639--40 (stating that EMSs have become 
internationally accepted as environmentally responsible best practices). 
31 See ROBERT P. SROUFE ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AS A SOURCE OF 
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 1 (1998), available athttp://www.asse.org/assets/l/7/EMS-CA.pdf ("One 
of the most important tasks for multinational firms will be to implement uniform environmental 
management practices and policies as they are driven by the convergence of national 
compliance requirements. [S]uggest[ing] that international EMS standards will serve as a 
guideline .... " (internal citations omitted)). 
32 See, e.g, Kulsum Ahmed, Using Supply-Cha.in Networks to Help Small and Medium-Sized 
Ente.tprises Adopt Environmental Management Systems, in SMALL FIRMS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: COLLECTIVE IMPACTS, COLLECTIVE ACTION 129, 129 (Allen Blackman 
ed., 2006) ("To maximize scarce enforcement resources, many developing countries' 
governments are increasingly using innovative approaches to promote compliance with 
environmental regulations."); Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Bolstering Private 
Environmental Management, ISSUES IN SCI & TECH, Spring 2001, at 69, 70 [hereinafter Coglianese 
& Nash, BolsteringJ ("Such approaches might even improve the efficiency of agency 
enforcement programs. If regulators know who· the 'bad guys' are, they can focus their 
enforcement resources where they will have the greatest impact."). 
33 See Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 
2067 (2005) (listing textbooks). But see J.B. RUHL ET AL., THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 816-827 (3d ed. 2013). 
34 Sara E. Light & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Govemance, in. 2 
DECISION MAKING IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 253, 264 (LeRoy c. Paddock et al. eds., 2016) 
("Students of law should be aware of and able to advise clients on private environmental 
standards, and should have the skills to engage in the private corporate law and administrative 
law activities that arise from private standard-setting, adjudication, enforcement, and dispute 
resolution."). 
35 See infra notes 40--42. 
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developed by W. Edwards Deming to improve the quality of products, often 
called the Deming circle or the "Plan-Do-Check-Act" model.36 
Figure 1. EMAS Diagram37 
The most widely used form of EMS in the world was developed by the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and launched in 1996.38 
ISO is a global nongovernmental organization whose members are national 
standards bodies.39 There are currently members from 163 countries.40 ISO 
36 Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Environment,aJ Management Systems and the New 
Policy Agenda, in REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE: CAN ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
ACHIEVE POLICY GoALS? 1, 10-11 (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2001) [hereinafter 
Coglianese & Nash, New Policy Agenda]; Stepan Wood, Environmenf,al Management Systems 
and Public Authority in Canada: Rethinking Environment,aJ Governance, 10 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 
129, 135 (2002-2003). The Author is distantly related to W. Edwards Deming, but never had the 
opportunity to meet him. 
37 EUR. CoMM'N, PREMIUM ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT: EU Eco-MANAGEMENT AND AUDIT 
SCHEME 3 (2016) [hereinafter EUR. CoMM'N, PREMIUM ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT), available 
athttp://ec.europa.eu/environment/emas/pdf/other/EMAS_General_Presentation_2014.pdf. 
38 David W. Case, Changing Corporate Behavior Through Environment,aJ Management 
Systems, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 75, 87-88 (2006) [hereinafter Case, Changing 
Corporate Behavio11; THEODORE L. BANKS & FREDERICK z. BANKS, CORPORATE LEGAL COMPLIANCE 
HANDBOOK 40-6 (2nd ed. Supp. 2016); Wood, supra note 36, at 136; Yang & Percival, supra note 
28, at 640. For a comprehensive history of the establishment of the ISO 14000 series of 
documents for EMSs, see Donald A Carr & William L. Thomas, Devising A Compliance Strategy 
Under the ISO 14000 International Environment,aJ Management Standards, 15 PACE ENVTL. L. 
REV. 85, 143-48 (1997). 
39 Int'! Org. for Standardization, About ISO, http://www.iso.org/iso/about.htm (la.st visited 
Nov. 19, 2016). 
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used the Deming model to develop its 9000 standard series for quality 
management. 41 ISO then chose that globally successful series as the basis for 
its ISO 14000 series to improve environmental performance in a manner 
similar to the improvements achieved for product quality through the 
implementation of the ISO 9000 series.42 The core principle of management 
systems is the delivery of improved performance through improvements in 
processes. 43 
EMSs can be implemented throughout an entire company, for a facility, 
or just for certain activities. 44 An essential component of every EMS is the 
identification of all environmental requirements of the operation: 
governmental laws and regulations, company policies and procedures, and 
requirements imposed by third-parties, such as customers and trade 
associations. 45 
40 Id Individuals and companies are not permitted to join ISO. Int'l Org. for 
Standardization, ISO Members, http://www.iso.org/iso/home/about/iso_members.htm (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2016). The member from the United States is the American National Standard 
Institute, which was founded in 1918. Int'l Org. for Standardization, United States (ANSI), 
http://www.iso.org/iso/home/about/iso_members/iso_member_body.htm?member_id=2188 (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2016). 
41 Case, Changing Co.l]Jorate Behavior, supra note 38, at 90-91; see also Jennifer Nash & 
John R. Ehrenfeld, Factors That Shape EMS Outcomes in Finns, in REGULATING FROM THE 
INSIDE: CAN ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ACHIEVE POIJCY GOALS?, supra note 32, at 61, 
77 (discussing how both ISO 9000 and ISO 14001 are grounded in continuous improvement 
models). 
42 See sources cited supra note 41; lnt'l Org. for Standardization, ISO 14000 - Environmental 
Management, http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/management-standards/iso14000.htm (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2016) [hereinafter ISO 14000] (explaining the focus of the ISO 14000 series, 
including ISO 14001). 
43 Case, Changing CoI]Jorate Behavior, supra note 38, at 90. 
44 Brengle, supra note 22, at 206. 
45 Coglianese & Nash, Bolstering, supra note 32, at 71. Many companies implement EMSs 
because their trading partners either require or give preference to vendors who have an EMS. 
Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private Contracting in Global 
Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913, 930-31, 956 (2007) [hereinafter Vandenbergh, Wal-Mart 
Effect]. Similarly, in South Africa, international market demands have driven environmental 
management performance rather than governmental enforcement. Willemien du Plessis & Johan 
Nel, Driving Compliance to and Enforcement of South African Legislation by Means of a Hybrid 
of "New" Environmental Governance Instruments, in COMPIJANCE AND ENFORCEMENT IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION 259, 262 (LeRoy Paddock et al. 
eds., 2011). Some commentators believe that requirements by private parties and organizations 
have created a new regime of private governance or private regulation. See, e.g, Vandenbergh, 
Private Environmental Governance, supra note 1, at 135; Vandenbergh, Wal-Mart Effect, supra 
note 45, at 915; McAllister, supra note 28, at 293. Two prominent trade association programs 
based on management systems are Responsible Care for chemical companies and Forest 
Stewardship Council for forestry. Du Plessis & Nel, supra at 45. The Forest Stewardship Council 
was legally established in 1994 and was a global organization from its inception. Forest 
Stewardship Council, History, https://ic.fsc.org/en/about-fsc/our-history (last visited Nov. 19, 
2016). Responsible Care started in Canada in the mid-1980s and in the United States in 1988. 
Am. Chemistry Council, Responsible Care, https://responsiblecare.americanchemistry.com/ 
default.aspx (last visited Nov. 19, 2016). In 2006, the International Council of Chemical 
Associations adopted a Responsible Care Global Charter, which was revised in 2014 and 
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Once a company or facility develops an environmental policy and 
identifies requirements as well as other desirable environmental endpoints 
("plan"), the company or facility implements what is necessary to achieve 
those endpoints ("do"), then evaluates whether the implementation is 
successful ("check"), and finally corrects any deficiencies that are found 
(''act").46 The action to correct the deficiencies then becomes part of a new 
plan-do-check-act cycle, and should result in continuous environmental 
improvement. 47 
The widely used ISO 14000 series provides companies with guidance on 
overall management of their environmental responsibilities.48 This series 
consists of 14001, which establishes the requirements for an EMS meeting 
ISO standards and gives guidance for use in operations, and several other 
additional standards for other environmental aspects such as 
communication, auditing, labeling, and reporting of greenhouse gases.49 ISO 
14001 was originally adopted in 1996, revised in 2004, and again in 2015, with 
the newest version referred to as 14001:2015.50 Some have criticized ISO 
14001 for the focus on improving environmental systems rather than 
environmental performance, and the lack of disclosure requirements for 
most environmental information.51 Changes include incorporating 
environmental management into an organization's strategic plan, adding an 
environmental performance improvement component in addition to the 
existing environmental management improvement requirement, and 
developing a communications strategy with equal emphasis on internal and 
external communications, but without any requirement to engage in external 
communications. 52 
contains six elements. INT'L COUNCIL OF CHEM. Ass'NS, YOUR GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
COUNCIL OF CHEMICAL ASSOCIATIONS RESPONSIBLE CARE GLOBAL CHARTER (2015), available at 
https://www.icca-chem.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Responsible-Care-Global-Charter-
Guide.pdf. 
46 Case, Changing Coiporate Behavior, supra note 38, at 89-90. 
47 Id at90. 
48 See ISO 14000, supra note 42. 
49 Id 
50 That is why the versions of 14001 are often referred.to as 14001:2004 and 14001:2015. Int'! 
Org. for Standardization, ISO 14001 Enviromnental Management Systems Revision, 
http://www.iso.org/iso/isol400l_revision Oast visited Nov. 19, 2016); see also Oren Perez et al., 
The Dynamic of Coiporate Self-Regulation: ISO 14001, Enviromnental Commitment, and 
Organizational Citizenship Behavior, 43 LAW & Soc'y REV. 593, 594 (2009) (stating that "ISO 
14001 was released in 1996, and a revised version was published in 2004"); ISO 14000, supra 
note 42 (stating that "[t]he ISO 14000 family of standards provides practical tools for companies 
and organizations of all kinds looking to manage their environmental responsibilities" and "ISO 
14001:2015 ... focus[ es] on environmental systems to achieve this"). 
51 Brengle, supra note 22, at 210; Case, Changing Coiporate Behavior, supra note 38, at 104. 
52 Int'! Org. for Standardization, ISO 14001:2015 - main changes since 2004 edition, 
https://committee.iso.org/sites/tc207scl/home/projectslpublished/iso-14001-environmental-
manage/main-changes.html Oast visited Nov. 19, 2016). 
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The ISO 14000 series standards have been recognized as best practices 
for environmental responsibility,53 and ISO 14001 is a significant component 
of both the EMAS and Performance Track programs. 54 
B. EMS Use Globally 
The importance of EMSs throughout the world is clearly demonstrated 
by their widespread use and growth. According to the most recent ISO 
survey for certified 14001 EMSs, there were 319,324 certificates in 2015.55 
Over 50% of the certifications were in East Asia and the Pacific, 37.5% were 
in Europe, and North America accounted for only 2.7%.56 
The growth of EMSs has not been driven by legal requirements. Instead, 
many governmental organizations developed programs, including EMAS and 
Performance Track, to incentivize or otherwise to encourage the 
implementation of EMSs. A good overview of the role EMSs have played to 
date in governmental programs is given by an Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) study issued in 2009.67 The study 
examined environmental compliance assurance regimes in eight countries 
representing diverse institutional, legal, and cultural backgrounds, including 
four European countries, Japan, and the United States, all members of 
OECD, along with China and Russia, two non-OECD members.68 
The report found a transition in many OECD countries from traditional 
regulatory compliance programs to voluntary initiatives more focused on 
encouraging innovation and sustainability, including the use of EMSs.69 One 
of the study's conclusions was that environmental authorities of OECD 
countries no longer considered it necessary to promote the implementation 
of EMSs.60 The reason given was that international market pressure was a far 
53 Yang & Percival, supra note 28, at 639-40. 
54 EUR. CoMM'N, EMAS FACTSHEET (2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
envirorunent/emas/pdf/factsheets/EMASisol400l_high.pdf ("The ISO 14001 Envirorunental 
Management System requirements are an integral part of EMAS."); Cary Coglianese & Jennifer 
Nash, Government Clubs: Theozy and Evidence from Voluntazy Environment,aJ Programs, in 
VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS: A CLUB THEORY PERSPECTIVE 231, 232 (Matthew Potoski & Aseem 
Prakash eds., 2009) (explaining how ISO 14001 and Performance Track have similar 
requirements). 
55 INT'L 0RG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, ISO SURVEY OF MANAGEMENT SYSTEM STANDARD 
CERTIFICATIONS - 2015, at 1 (2015), available at http://www.iso.org/iso/the_iso_survey_of_ 
management_system_standard_certifications_2015. 
56 INT'L 0RG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, ISO SURVEY OF MANAGEMENT SYSTEM STANDARD 
CERTIFICATIONS (1999-2015): ISO 14001 - ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (2015) 
[hereinafter, 2015 ISO SURVEY DATA), available at http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_l400l_iso_ 
survey2015.xls (view "ISO 14001 Overview" sheet). 
57 OECD, ENSURING ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE, supra note 17, at 24-34. 
58 Id at 18. 
59 Id at94. 
60 See id at 52-53 (noting a distinct change from the active encouragement of EMSs in the 
1990s when governments adopted incentives such as permitting privileges and decreased 
compliance inspections). 
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"more powerful factor" than regulatory agencies,61 including for example, the 
impact of demands from large corporations on their suppliers for good 
environmental performance. 62 
However, this begs the question: Why do these large corporations 
require EMSs to support their environmental requirements? Could it be 
because they themselves participate in EMAS, or, at the time, Performance 
Track, which would mean that these programs still played a role? The report 
did not answer these questions. Even if governmental incentives were not a 
major factor, however, the fact that corporations are creating a significant 
demand for EMSs means that they concluded that EMSs have substantial 
value. 
In contrast, authorities in China continue to actively encourage 
companies to get EMS certifications.63 China's State Bureau of Technical and 
Quality Supervision adopted standards from the ISO 14000 series and 
approved a national ISO 14001 certification program. 64 There are also several 
economic incentives in China for obtaining ISO 14001 certification.65 
One of the key trends identified in the OECD report, "clearly visible in 
all the countries," is the increasing reliance on compliance promotion, which 
includes encouraging the adoption of EMSs.66 Additional trends that can be 
facilitated by EMSs include targeting compliance monitoring by risk, 
selfrnonitoring by regulated entities, and enhancing transparency and public 
discussion. 67 
C. The Relationship of EMSs to Environmental Performance and 
Compliance 
EMSs are aptly described as a "holistic approach to environmental 
compliance, focusing on the entire company's interaction with the 
environment and environmental regulations, instead of a piecemeal 
approach. "68 Several different departments, disciplines, and external 
stakeholders collaborate to implement an EMS, which provides many 
benefits. 69 This collaboration promotes "interdisciplinary brainstorming, "10 
61 Id at53. 
62 Id 
63 Id at 186. 
64 Id 
65 Id 
66 Id at94-95. 
67 Id 
68 BANKS & BANKS, supra note 38, at 40-6. 
69 Brengle, supra note 22, at 206-07; Magali Delmas & Michael W. Toffel, St.akeholders and 
Environmental Management Practices: An Institutional Framework, 13 Bus. STRATEGY & ENV'T. 
209, 216 (2004) ("Voluntary strategies involve creative problem solving and collaborative 
interactions with stakeholders .... Companies can also work directly with customers and 
suppliers to improve their environmental performance. Furthermore, they may engage in 
systematic communication, consultation and collaboration with their key stakeholders ... [and] 
host stakeholder forums and establish permanent stakeholder advisory panels at either the 
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and has been identified as "an important source of technological and social 
innovation."11 The meeting of corporate functions managers with operational 
employees also results in a more integrated assessment of a facility's 
operations and the institutionalization of responses to a full range of 
environmental concerns. 72 
In addition, compliance is a required element of most EMSs,73 and EMSs 
have been recognized as useful ·in facilitating compliance.74 The 
identification and assessment of legal obligations, in addition to operational 
requirements and goals, is required; therefore, compliance professionals, 
including lawyers, should be involved in the EMS process at a facility. This 
involvement facilitates a better understanding by those compliance 
professionals of the impact that legal rules have when implemented, while 
also providing valuable information that can help those compliance officers 
to better explain legal rules to their clients and coworkers. 76 
Another important benefit of incorporating an ISO 14001 EMS into a 
company's compliance structure is that it is a globally recognized process 
for monitoring compliance and enhancing environmental performance. 76 The 
operations of an increasing number of businesses are governed by the laws 
and regulations of more than one country. 77 International market demands 
have also driven the adoption of EMSs. 78 In fact, some consider the ISO 
corporate level, the plant level, or to address a specific issue." (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
70 Brengle, supra note 22, at 206--07. 
71 Perez et al., supra note 50, at 598. 
72 Case, Changing Corporate Behavior, supra note 38, at 102-03. 
73 One of the few absolute requirements of an ISO 14001 EMS is a commitment to comply 
with all "applicable legal requirements and with other requirements to which the organization 
subscribes." John Barwise & Stephen Battersby, Environmental Management Systems, in CLAY'S 
HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH 281, 298 (Stephen Battersby, ed., 21st ed. 2017). 
INT'L 0RG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, ISO 14004:2016: ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS-
GENERAL GUIDELINES ON IMPLEMENTATION, at vi (2016). 
74 lNT'L 0RG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, ISO 14001 CONTINUAL IMPROVEMENT SURVEY 2013, at 3 
(2014) [hereinafter after ISO 14001 CONTINUAL IMPROVEMENT SURVEY 2013], available at 
http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_l 400l_survey _2013_-_final_report_and_analysis.pdf; BANKS & BANKS, 
supra note 38, at 40-6; Matthew Potoski & Aseem Prakash, Green Clubs and Voluntazy 
Compliance: ISO 14001 and Finns' Regulatory Compliance, 49 AM. J. POL. Ser. 235, 246 (2005) 
("Results from our empirical analysis imply that joining ISO 14001 reduced facilities' time spent 
out of compliance by about 7% or 25 days out of a year."). 
75 As an environmental counsel for several years to a global Swiss-based manufacturing 
company, the Author was involved in many aspects of EMSs, which she found to be very 
beneficial to the implementation of environmental compliance. 
76 See Theodore Panayotou, Environmental Management Systems and the Global Economy, 
in REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE: CAN ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ACHIEVE POLICY 
GOALS?, supra note 32, at 105, 109, 115, 121; Case, Changing Corporate Behavior, supra note 38, 
at87-88. 
77 Panayotou, supra note 76, at 110. 
78 Vandenbergh, Wal-Mart Effect, supra note 45, at 956; du Plessis & Nels, supra note 45, at 
262. Some of this demand is the result of voluntary codes imposing private standards developed 
by industry trade associations rather than governmental incentives. See McAllister, supra note 
28, at 306. These codes may provide a stronger basis for changing corporate culture because 
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14000 family of standards as contributing to the global "harmonization of 
environmental standards, primarily by facilitating corporate behavior 
changes."79 They also "encourage[] convergence in corporate behavior 
worldwide. "80 
In addition, if the facility is owned by a corporation with its 
headquarters in another jurisdiction, the laws of that jurisdiction may also 
apply to the operation of that facility, either directly81 or indirectly through 
corporate policies that seek to have uniform rules apply to all of the 
corporation's operations.82 Therefore, EMSs can assist lawyers and other 
compliance personnel trained in the law of one country to better assess a 
company's operations in other jurisdictions.83 
A main concern regarding the use of EMSs as part of a regulatory 
regime is whether the information developed by EMSs is sufficiently reliable 
to determine a facility's compliance with all requirements and to assess 
whether an EMS is producing environmental benefits beyond those achieved 
by compliance.84 However, "there is substantial support for the point that 
implementation of an EMS is associated with better environmental 
performance, both on regulated emissions and on the use of resources that 
are not directly regulated."86 There is also evidence that ISO 14001 facilities 
groups of companies are acting together. David Morrow & Dennis Rondinelli, Adopting 
Coiporate Environmental Management Systems: Motivations and Results of ISO 14001 and 
EMAS Certification, 20 EUR. MGMT. J. 159, 162 (2002) ("[M]any multinational companies are 
adopting EMS to satisfy customer pressures and to ensure that their suppliers are operating in 
environmentally and socially responsible ways. Some are doing so in response to peer pressure 
as more corporations adopt environmental management systems and require their second and 
third tier suppliers to do so as well."). 
79 Yang & Percival, supra note 28, at 639; see also Vandenbergh, Wal-Mart Effect, supra note 
45, at 915 ("This new global private governance is global, rather than international, in that 
nation-states are not participants."). 
80 Yang & Percival, supra note 28, at 640. 
81 See, e.g., U.S. ENVrL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 29, at 17 (noting the Toxic Substances 
Control Act requirement to produce health and environmental studies from parent companies 
and affiliates, even if the entity in possession of the date is located outside the United States). 
82 Yang & Percival, supra note 28, at 639-40. 
83 Id at 640 n.141. 
84 Coglianese & Nash, New Policy Agenda, supra note 36, at 18-19 (identifying the value of 
systematic management as a benefit, but noting several other reservations about the ability of 
EMSs to deliver benefits sufficient to justify concessions that might be given to induce their 
implementation). In particular, they urged policymakers to distinguish between the effects 
caused by an EMS from those that might have resulted from other factors already in a company. 
Id In a subsequent study of the Performance Track program in the United States, they 
confirmed the validity of that concern for that program. Coglianese & Nash, Perfonnance 
Track's Postmortem, supra note 14, at 82. 
85 Kurt A. Strasser, Do Voluntazy Coiporate Efforts Improve Environmental Perfonnance?: 
The Empirical Literature, 35 B.C. ENVrL. AFF. L. REV. 533, 554 (2008). The author did question 
whether EMSs achieved better compliance and urged caution in implementing programs with 
certain regulatory benefits. Id at 555 ("Better program design, with real monitoring and 
performance sanctions, and new and better studies, may provide empirical support for 
incorporating voluntary efforts into the public regulatory system for containing environmental 
risks. The empirical support is not yet there."). 
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have better compliance records.86 This is confirmed by the most recent ISO 
14001 Continual Improvement Survey from 2013, which included an 
unprecedented 5,000 participants from 110 countries worldwide responding 
in 111 different languages.87 A majority (54%) of the responses were from 
user organizations with over 250 employees.88 Of the nineteen environmental 
management concepts identified in a report on future challenges, 77% of 
environmental managers viewed ISO 1400l's ability to meet legal 
requirements as providing high or very high value.89 
Another potential benefit that can flow from EMSs is the public 
disclosure and sharing of information produced by the process, and many 
EMS standards and guidelines require the production of information to make 
operations more transparent.90 This transparency, in turn, provides 
information that can be used in many different ways beyond simply 
improving company operations.91 Public disclosure of information derived 
from EMSs can also assist regulators, 92 as well as facilitate community 
involvement93 and the achievement of societal environmental goals. 94 
Ill. EMAS AND PERFORMANCE TRACK 
Both EMAS and Performance Track are government-sponsored 
voluntary programs designed to encourage organizations to improve 
environmental performance through incentives.95 The EMAS regulation was 
86 Potoski & Prakash, supra note 74, at 235 ("The results imply that as a group ISO 14001 
certified facilities have better compliance records than if they had not joined the program."); 
Bel\iamin J. Richardson, Is East Asia Industrializing Too Quickly? Enviromnental Regulation in 
Its Special Economic Zones, 22 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 150, 235-36 (2004) ("Some empirical 
research in East Asia shows that ISO 14001 certified companies have a record of better 
compliance with government environmental regulations and standards than non ISO-certified 
companies."). 
87 ISO 14001 CONTINUAL IMPROVEMENT SURVEY 2013, supra note 7 4, at 3. 
88 Id 
89 Id at 7. 
90 Case, Changing Cozporate Behavior, supra note 38, at 103-04; Hope M. Babcock, 
Cozporate Enviromnental Social Responsibility: Cozporate "Greenwashing" or a Cozporate 
Culture Game Changer?, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 59-60, 63-64 (2010) (recommending that 
voluntary initiatives such as EMSs and Responsible Care could be improved by public 
disclosure). 
91 See David Walker, Sust;ainability: Enviromnental Management, Transparency, and 
Competitive Advantage, 7 J. RETAIL LEISURE & PROP. 119, 129 (2008) (enumerating various 
potential benefits for companies that disclose data generated by EMSs). 
92 Du Plessis & Nels, supra note 45, at 274. 
93 See, e.g., Am. Chemistry Council, Accountability, https://responsiblecare.americanchem 
istry.com/ResponsibleCare/Performance-Results/Accountability-2/ Oast visited Nov. 19, 2016) 
(discussing community outreach). 
94 Case, Changing Cozporate Behavior, supra note 38, at 106. 
95 See Strasser, supra note 85, at 535 (describing voluntary commitment programs); Dennis 
D. Hirsch, Green Business and the hnpoJtance of Reflexive Law: What Michael Poiter Didn't 
&zy; 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 1063, 1118-19 (2010) (discussing positive information strategy used by 
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introduced by the European Commission in 1993, and formal registration in 
the program was opened in April 1995. 96 EPA started pilot programs in the 
mid-1990s to encourage the use of EMSs, which evolved into the 
Performance Track program. 97 
A.EMAS 
EMAS is an integral part of the European Union's environmental policy. 
The European Commission of the European Union considers EMAS to be 
the "most credible and robust environmental management tool on the 
market, adding several elements on top of the requirements of the 
international standard for Environmental Management Systems EN ISO 
14001:2004"98 The European Commission itself registered with EMAS in 2005, 
and credits EMAS with achieving its own organizational environmental 
commitments to continuously reduce its environmental impact. 99 
The core of EMAS is an ISO 14001 EMS. 100 However, EMAS has 
identified several areas where its requirements go beyond the ISO 14001 
standard, including a requirement for extensive public disclosure of the 
environmental performance information of its members. 101 A further 
difference is compliance because EMAS makes participants "demonstrate 
that they have identified, and know the implications ... of all applicable 
legal requirements relating to the environment, ... provide for legal 
compliance ... , and have procedures in place that enable the organisation 
to meet these requirements on an ongoing basis. "102 EMAS also requires 
compliance audits. 103 The most recent EMAS scheme, EMAS III, implemented 
in 2010, sought to address the continuing concern regarding how to best 
measure and verify the benefits achieved by facilities and companies 
incorporating the EMAS requirements into their operations. 104 The current 
EMAS scheme requires organizations to report on six specific environmental 
core indicators in an effort to allow "organisations [to] compare their 
environmental performance both over different reporting periods and with 
the environmental performance of other organisations. "106 The core 
EMAS and Performance Track); Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 
1227, 1233, 1290 (1995) (describing EMAS as reflexive regulation). 
96 Eur. Comm'n, Join EMAS: FAQs, http://ec.europaeu/environment/emas/join_ 
emas/faqs_en.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2016). 
97 Coglianese & Nash, Performance Track's Postmortem, supra note 14, at l&-22. 
98 EUR. COMM'N, EMAS AND ISO 14001: COMPLEMENTARITIES AND DIFFERENCES l (2011), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/emas/pdf/factsheets/EMASisol400l_high. pdf. 
99 EUR. COMM'N, 2015 ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT 4 (2015), available at http://ec. 
europa.eu/environment/emas/pdf/other/20160122_ES_2015_Final_lO_MB.pdf. 
100 Case, Changing Corporate Behavior, supra note 38, at 89. 
101 Id at 104-05. 
102 Council Regulation 1221/2009, 2009 O.J. (L 342) 1, 25 (EC). 
103 Id at 32. 
104 Id at 1-2. 
105 Id at 2, 3&-37. 
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indicators are: energy efficiency, material efficiency, water, waste, 
biodiversity, and emissions. 105 
Beyond recognition as a member of EMAS, incentives to join the 
program have been l.eft to the "competent bodies" of individual nations. 107 
The most prevalent incentive used by competent bodies is extending the 
duration of an organization's permit. 108 Other measures include reduction of 
financial guarantees required for some activities, tax reduction, inspection 
frequency reduction and self-declaration for renewing a permit. 109 
Since 2010, the number of organizatfons participating in in EMAS has 
varied, from a peak of almost 4,700 in April 2011, to a low of under 3,800 in 
December 2013, with an increase to over 4,000 again in May 2016. 110 The 
number of sites registered with EMAS for the same time period went from a 
peak of over 10,000 in December 2013, to a low of under 7,000 in March 
2014. 111 The current number is just over 9,000. 112 For the years during which 
Performance Track was in place, there were more than 2,800 organizations 
and sites registered with EMAS in March 2000, 113 and more than 4,200 
organizations and 6, 700 sites at the end of 2008. 114 EMAS membership may 
have declined slightly due to the more stringent requirements imposed by 
the 2010 revision to EMAS III. 115 
106 Id at37. 
107 Orts, supra note 95, at 1307 ("Invoking the subsidiarity principle, the EMAS regulation 
devolves responsibility to the EU Member States to 'establish a system for the accreditation of 
independent environmental verifiers' and to supervise them. Each Member State must either 
designate a 'competent body' for the task or 'use existing accreditation institutions.'" (footnote 
omitted) (quoting Council Regulation 1836/93 art. 6(1), 1993 O.J. (L 168) 1, 4 (EC))). 
108 Iraldo Presentation, supra note 25, at 20; Testa et al., supra note 25, at 2239-40 & fig. I. 
109 Iraldo Presentation, supra note 25, at 20. 
llO EUR. COMM'N, 0FF1CIAL STATISTICS OF THE EUROPEAN EMAS HELPDESK, EVOLUTION OF 
ORGANISATIONS AND SITES (2016), available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/emas/pdf/ 
statistics/PDF _Statistic_May _2016.pdf [hereinafter EMAS STATISTICS]. 
lll Id 
ll2 Id 
ll3 See EUR. COMM'N, PREMIUM ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, supra note 37, at 15 (EMAS 
statistics did not distinguish between organizational and site members until 2004). There is a 
discrepancy between this chart and the one cited in the previous footnote. The Author 
requested and received clarification from the EMAS Helpdesk stating that the discrepancy is 
primarily caused by underreporting by Germany to EMAS of all the registrations in that country. 
E-mail from EMAS Helpdesk, Directorate-Gen. for the Env't, Eur. Comm'n, to Rachel E. 
Deming, Assistant Professor, Barry Univ. Dwayne 0. Andreas Sch. Of Law (Feb. 8, 2016) (on file 
with author). Those numbers have been added to the more recent chart for years 2010-2015. Id 
It is possible that the numbers reported for years before 2010 were also underreported. The 
figures from Germany can be independently accessed. Umwelt Gutachter Ausschuss, EMAS in 
Zahlen - Statistiken, http://www.emas.de/ueber-emas/emas-in-zahlen/ (last visited Nov. 19, 
2016). 
ll4 See EUR. COMM'N, PREMIUM ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, supra note 37, at 15. 
ll5 Join EMAS: FAQs, supra note 96 ("ln 2009 the EMAS Regulation was revised and 
modified for the second time. Regulation (EC) No 1221/2009 ... was published on 22 December 
2009. The revised EMAS Regulation came into effect on 11 January 2010."). 
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B. Performance Track 
In contrast with EMAS, Performance Track was never an integral part 
of environmental policy in the United States. Performance Track began in 
1994, when EPA launched a pilot program called the Environmental 
Leadership Program to encourage operating facilities to implement EMSs. 116 
This program was merged into Performance Track, which was actively 
promoted starting in 2000 near the end of the Clinton Administration, and 
continued to be supported under the Bush Administration. 117 It was 
considered an experimental program that was regularly evaluated for 
demonstrable environmental benefits. 118 
EPA was hoping to encourage measurable and meaningful 
environmental performance by "recogniz[ing] and reward[ing] facilities that 
consistently exceed regulatory requirements, work closely with their 
communities, and excel in protecting the environment and public health. "119 
It was "based on the premise that government should complement existing 
programs with new tools and strategies that not only protect people and the 
environment, but also capture opportunities for reducing costs and spurring 
technological innovation. "120 
The key criteria for Performance Track participation were: 1) an 
audited EMS; 2) a record of compliance; 3) beyond-compliance 
commitments; and 4) community outreach. 121 In establishing beyond-
compliance commitment achievements, EPA selected categories of 
environmental indicators from which participating facilities could choose, 
and also set some measuring criteria. 122 The program was evaluated and 
criticized by EPA's Office of Inspector General (OIG) in a 2007 report, as 
well as by some environmental groups who claimed that the program could 
not demonstrate environmental improvements. 123 The United States House of 
116 Coglianese & Nash, Perfonnance Track's Postmortem, supra note 14, at 16-18; Case, 
Changing Corporate Behavior, supra note 38, at 98. 
117 See Coglianese & Nash, Performance Track's Postmortem, supra note 14, at 22-24 
(noting that EPA published the formal description in the Federal Register in July 2000, and did 
not terminate the program until after President Bush left office). 
118 Id at 3fr-39. Environmental advocacy groups wanted more stringent entry requirements 
in exchange for the program's regulatory benefits. Id at 71. 
119 0FF1CE OF POLICY, ECON., & INNOVATION, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-100-R-03-004, 
PERFORMANCE TRACK PROGRESS REPORT: TOP PERFORMERS, SOLID RESULTS 3 (2003). 
120 Id 
121 Coglianese & Nash, Perfonnance Track's Postmortem, supra note 14, at 25-26. 
122 Id at 26. 
123 0FF1CE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2007-P-00013, EVALUATION REPORT: 
PERFORMANCE TRACK COULD IMPROVE PROGRAM DESIGN AND MANAGEMENT TO ENSURE VALUE 11 
(2007) [hereinafter OIG PERFORMANCE TRACK REPORT], available at 
http://www. epagov/sites/production/files/2015-1 l/documents/20070329-2007-p-00013.pdf; See 
also RAND AsSESSMENT, supra note 9, at 2 (noting the criticism Performance Track received 
from OIG and some environmental groups); Coglianese & Nash, Perfonnance Track's 
Postmortem, supra note 14, at 7-8 (same). Environmental advocacy groups wanted more 
stringent requirements in exchange for regulatory benefits. Id at 7 n.27. 
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Representatives approved a bill that significantly reduced funding for 
Perlormance Track, and shortly thereafter, Lisa P. Jackson, the EPA 
Administrator appointed by newly elected President Obama, terminated the 
program. 124 In the last year of the program's operations, 2008, the number of 
new participants declined although the total number of participants rose, 
largely because of an 85% renewal rate, which the Perlormance Track 
program sponsors found to be significant given the recession at the time. 126 
The total number of participating facilities on a yearly basis, however, never 
exceeded 600.126 Since the decision to withdraw Performance Track, EPA has 
not publicly engaged in any further consideration of implementing programs 
to encourage the use of EMSs. 
Although Performance Track is gone, some significant U.S. 
governmental programs acknowledging the value of EMSs remain.121 The 
United States federal government co.µtinues to rely on EMSs as the "primary 
management approach" to achieve its own sustainability goals for all federal 
agencies. 128 This effort started in 2000, was expanded in 2007, and was 
endorsed and expanded again in 2009, shortly after withdrawal of the 
Performance Track program. 129 In addition, EPA still allows facilities with 
violations in connection with an EMS process to receive penalty reductions 
if those violations are self-reported. 130 EPA also imposes stringent 
124 RAND AsSESSMENT, supra note 9, at 3 (stating that the United States House of 
Representatives significantly reduced Performance Track's budget and shortly thereafter EPA 
Administrator Lisa P. Jackson halted Performance Track); Notice to Terminate the National 
Envirorunental Performance Track Program, 74 Fed. Reg. 22,741, 22, 742 (May 14, 2009); see also 
Memorandum from Lisa P. Jackson to Performance Track Members, Performance Track Corp. 
Leaders, and State Envtl. Comm'rs, supra note 18, at 32-33 ("Performance Track was developed 
in a different era and may not speak to today's challenges."). 
125 0FF1CE OF POLICY, ECON., & INNOVATION, U.S. ENVTL. l'ROT. AGENCY, EPA-100-R-09-003, 
PERFORMANCE TRACK FINAL PROGRESS REPORT 1 (2009) [hereinafter EPA, PERFORMANCE TRACK 
FINAL REPORT], available at http://archive.epa.gov/performancetrack/web/pdf/pt_progrprt_ 
2009_ web.pdf. 
126 Coglianese & Nash, Perfonnance Track's Postmortem, supra note 14, at 66. 
127 See· id at 8-9 (listing, among other things, state versions of Performance Track, 
voluntary EPA programs such as Energy Star, and programs modeled after Performance Track 
that are run by other agencies). 
128 Strengthening Federal Envirorunental, Energy, and Transportation Management, Exec. 
Order No. 13,423, § 3(b), 3 C.F.R. at 193, 195 (2008). 
129 Greening the Goverrunent Through Leadership in Envirorunental Management, Exec. 
Order No. 13,148, § 201, 3 C.F.R. at 241, 242 (2001); Exec. Order No. 13,423, § 3(b), 3 C.F.R. at 
193, 195 (2008); Federal Leadership in Envirorunental, Energy, and Economic Performance, 
Exec. Order No. 13,514, § 2Ci), 3 C.F.R. at 248, 252 (2009). 
130 Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of 
Violations, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,618, 19,621, 19,625 (Apr. 11, 2000); see also Timothy F. Malloy, 
Regulation, Compliance and the Finn, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 451, 515 (2003) ("[T]he incentives 
offered by such programs as Performance Track; the promise of less frequent inspections 
would be most valued by those firms that are subject to higher numbers of inspections, and that 
accordingly face a higher likelihood of violations being detected .... The added incentive of 
reduced penalties may result in limited increases in the use of management systems among 
such fmns."); EPA INNOVATIONS TASK FORCE, U.S. ENVTL. l'ROT. AGENCY, EPA 100-R-99-006, 
AlMlNG FOR EXCELLENCE: ACTIONS TO ENCOURAGE STEWARDSHIP AND ACCELERATE ENVIRONMENTAL 
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compliance-focused EMSs on some parties entering into consent decree 
settlements to resolve serious compliance issues. 131 Some states have also 
retained programs designed to encourage the use of EMSs.132 
C. Summary 
EMAS membership began five years before Performance Track, but 
from the outset it generated far more interest than Performance Track. 
When Performance Track started, EMAS already had over 2,800 organization 
and site members. 133 By the time Performance Track ended, EMAS had 
increased to more than 4,200 organizations and 6, 700 sites, 134 while 
Performance Track had 54 7 members. 136 Some authors have stated that use 
of EMAS is very small, especially when compared to ISO 14001 registrations, 
which bears further research. 136 However, the number of EMAS registrations 
compared to Performance Track is striking. 
IV. IMPACT ON ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE 
This Part examines two studies commissioned by the European 
Commission to evaluate EMAS,137 a study prepared by EPA OIG,138 a study 
commissioned by EPA, 139 and an article examining Performance Track, 
based in part on another study commissioned by EPA that was conducted by 
PROGRESS 9 (1999), ("EPA has waived or reduced penalties for companies that voluntarily audit, 
disclose, and correct environmental violations and that take action to prevent future ones."). 
131 See ENVI'L. L. INST., 1 LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION§ 9:126 (Sheldon M. Novick et 
al. eds., Spring 2016 ed.) (regarding use in consent decrees). 
132 Coglianese & Nash, Perfonnance Track's Postmortem, supra note 14, at 33-34, 77-79. 
133 EUR. COMM'N, PREMIUM ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, supra note 37, at 15. Performance 
Track began being actively promoted in 2000. See supra note 117. EMAS did not distinguish 
between site and organizational members at that time. See supra note 113. 
134 EUR. COMM'N, PREMIUM ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, sup'ra note 37; at 15. Performance 
Track ended in 2008. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
135 EPA, PERFORMANCE TRACK FINAL REPORT, supra note 125, at 3. 
136 See, e.g, Case, Changing Corporate Behavior, supra note 38, at 89 ("The perception that 
EMAS and ISO 14001 were in direct competition contributed to low rates of participation in the 
EMAS program."); Frank Watzold et al., EMAS and Regulatory Relief in Europe: Lessons from 
National Experience, 11 EUR. ENV'T 37, 38 (2001) ("Apart from in Germany and Austria, 
corporate participation in EMAS has remained low throughout the EU, lagging well behind 
participation in the international environmental management systems standard DIN 
IS014001."). 
137 JAN VERNON ET AL., MlIJEU LTD & RISK & POLICY ANALYSIS LTD, STUDY ON THE COSTS AND 
BENEFITS OF EMAS TO REGISTERED ORGANISATIONS: FINAL REPORT (Catherine Ganzleben ed., 
2009), available at http://ec.europaeu/environment/emas/pdf/other/costs_and_benefits_of_emas 
.pdf; Iraldo Presentation, supra note 25. 
138 OIG PERFORMANCE TRACK REPORT' supra note 123. 
139 RAND AsSESSMENT, supra note 9. 
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the authors of the article.1• 0 These studies were chosen because they were all 
commissioned or performed by the ·respective regulatory authority, the 
Directorate-General of the European Commission (DG Environment/41 and 
EPA. They are similar in their approach and the information they collected, 
which included; literature reviews; interviews with regulatory authorities, 
participants, and stakeholders; and analyses of program data. 142 
It should be noted at the outset, however, that it is very hard to assess 
the available information on the performance of these voluntary programs. 
As the RAND Corporation noted in its 2010 study of Performance Track: 
[A]s VPs [voluntary programs] have become more common, researchers have 
developed academic theories to explain why VPs may - or may not - be 
effective. Some researchers have created economic models of VPs that build 
on principles of incentives, while others have created theoretical frameworks 
derived from observing existing programs. However, there is no 
interdisciplinary consensus on how to study or explain VPs, and there is no 
generally accepted theory of how VPs should work. Rather, the literature has 
proposed theories to explain features of VPs and examined the empirical 
evidence on their impacts. 143 
A report issued by EPA's Environmental Financial Advisory Board (EFAB) 
also found that there was not sufficient information to quantify the benefits 
of implementing EMSs in order to achieve recognition in the capital 
markets. 144 
A.EMAS 
DG Environment commissioned two comprehensive studies to evaluate 
the benefits and costs of EMAS registration. The first study, completed in 
2009, investigated the benefits and costs to organizations that register with 
EMAS, as well as incentives and barriers to participation. 145 One of the 
study's key objectives was to explore the kinds of benefits organizations 
140 Coglianese & Nash, Perfonnance Track's Postmortem, supra note 14 (the research 
underlying the article was partially funded by a grant from EPA's Office of Policy, Economics, 
and Innovation). 
141 Eur. Comm'n, EnviroIIIllent Directorate-General, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/ 
environment/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2016) (noting that the DG Environment is the 
European Commission department responsible for setting environmental policy for the 
European Union). 
142 JAN VERNON ET AL., supra note 137, at i; lraldo Presentation, supra note 25, at 4; Testa et 
al, supra note 25, at 2233--37; Daddi et al., supra note 25, at 648-52; OIG PERFORMANCE TRACK 
REPORT, supra note 123, at 3; RAND AsSESSMENT, supra note 9, at xiv-xv. 
143 RAND AsSESSMENT, supra note 9, at 80 (citation omitted). 
144 ENVfL. FIN. ADVISORY BD., U.S. ENVfL. PROT. AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEMS AND THE USE OF CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION BY THE FINANCIAL COMMUNITY 
7 (2008), available at https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe1ZyPDF.cgi/PlOOAM3C.PDF?Dockey=PlOOA 
M3C.PDF. The Author was the chair of the EFAB workgroup and primary author of the report. 
145 JAN VERNON ET AL., supra note 137, at i. 
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participating in EMAS receive, and in particular to document "soft" benefits 
in addition to more easily measured economic costs and benefits. 146 The 
study included "looking inside the black box of internal organisational 
management in order to understand what kindS of internal characteristics 
determine an organisation's capacity to reap benefits from EMAS, as well as 
influencing the costs of registration and implementation. "147 
That study concluded that the main benefits to EMAS members were 
increased efficiency and energy savings, with the results showing "clear 
evidence of substantial financial savings from reduced energy costs 
following EMAS."148 The study also noted, however, that those benefits are 
likely to dwindle over time because they will be hard to continuously 
replicate those savings. 149 
The second main benefit was the reduction in negative environmental 
incidents. 150 
The second most widely acknowledged benefit of EMAS in the questionnaire 
was a reduction in negative incidents. This result was reinforced in follow up 
interviews, where several manufacturing organisations confirmed that the 
implementation of a robust EMS had given them an overview of their 
processes and facilitated greater control, leading to a reduction in incidents 
and a reduced effort for internal monitoring. This has obvious linkages with 
benefits relating to improved relations with regulatory authorities. This 
evidence relating to reduced incidents is important, as similar· evidence was 
not found in the literature review. 151 
Weighing against the potential gain from avoidance of accidents, EMASs 
cost on average 48,000 implement, and the 26,000 annually thereafter to 
maintain. 152 The most important barrier to registration identified in the study 
was that the benefits of registration were "unclear of [sic] did not justify the 
costs" of registration, "153 
DG Environment commissioned another study, the results of which 
were reported at the High Level Conference on EMAS in November 2015.154 
The key research questions addressed by the study were: 1) If a public body 
promotes EMAS, is it effectively pursuing environmental improvement; and 
2) what are the different roles for a public body?,'.55 The study included a 
survey of 467 registered organizations and an analysis of the required 
146 Id at 1. 
147 Id 
148 Id at92-93. 
149 Id at93. 
150 Id 
151 Id at93. 
152 Id at 76. However, costs incurred in responding to accidents far outweigh the costs 
required to prevent accidents. 
153 JAN VERNON ET AL., supra note 137, at 91. 
154 Iraldo Presentation, supra note 25. 
155 Id at 3. 
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environmental statements submitted by 122 EMAS registered organizations 
from 2012 to 2014.156 
One of the key findings was that about 75% of the interviewees believed 
that the prevention of risks and accidents improved, with 30% of all 
interviewees stating that the improvement was significant. 157 This confirmed 
the results found in the previous EMAS study, discussed above. The 
environmental statement analysis found that EMAS members continued to 
demonstrate improvements in energy use, improved their air and carbon 
dioxide emissions, had no improvements in water consumption, and had 
negative results for waste and material efficiency. 158 The interviewees stated 
that the EMS used to fulfill the EMAS requirements was secQnd only to 
technical progress as the most important factors for the performance 
improvements. 159 The study also noted several other improvements in 
addition to performance, including legislative compliance, and, as mentioned 
above, reduced risk of environmental sanctions and accidents.160 
B. Perfonnance Track 
The beginning of Performance Track's end was heralded by a report by 
EPA's OIG in 2007. OIG conducted its study during 2006, the same year that 
Harvard's Kennedy School of Government recognized Performance Track as 
one of the 50 top innovations in American government, one of only 13 
federal programs receiving that recognition.161 The purpose of OIG's study 
was "to evaluate how effectively Performance Track achieve[d] its 
environmental goals," specifically how Performance Track "improve[d] 
environmental performance through pollution prevention and innovation," 
and how well it accomplished its goal of "recogniz[ing] and encourag[ing] 
top environmental performers and track[ing] program performance. "162 OIG 
concluded that the program's design was not clearly linked to intended 
outcomes, that it did not generally fulfill its "value proposition," and that 
some members exceeded their sector averages for noncompliance and toxic 
releases. 163 While the Performance Track program managers concurred with 
OIG's recommendations for improvements, they did dispute much of OIG's 
methodology and analysis, and also believed that OIG did not give sufficient 
credit for the benefits the program did achieve. 164 
156 Id at 4, 7. 
157 Id at 6. 
158 Id at 8. 
159 Id at 11. 
160 Id at 13. 
161 OIG PERFORMANCE TRACK REPORT, supra note 123, at 31. 
162 Id at 1. 
163 Id at 15, 23. 
164 Id at29. 
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The RAND Corporation completed its study of Performance Track in 
2010, after the program terrninated. 165 The study was started, however, in 
2008 to address the criticisms in and issues raised by OIG's report, including 
whether the initial concepts were sound, whether the program design 
reflected those concepts, and whether the program played a role in 
delivering environmental irnprovements. 166 The report confirmed OIG's 
concern about the lack of detail in the program's concepts.167 In contrast to 
OIG's report, it found that Performance Track encouraged a broad range of 
environmental improvements among most of its members. 168 These 
improvements were more qualitative and quantitative, including: 
the application process taught them how to quantify the broad environmental 
impacts of their activities and set goals for continuous improvement. 
Performance Track's members also reported a range of changes in their 
corporate culture, including increased consideration of environmental issues in 
formal decision-making processes, greater employee awareness and 
engagement on environmental issues, the introduction of environmental 
considerations into informal problem-solving efforts, and improved recruiting 
results, employee retention, and employee morale. 169 
Another finding was that the "brand" of the program was undermined 
because environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and some 
regulators believed membership criteria to be too lenient and some 
members withdrew because they decided that the costs outweighed the 
benefits. 110 
In response to a final purpose of the report, to evaluate whether there 
was a regulatory role for the approach represented by Performance Track in 
combination with other regulatory approaches, the report concluded that 
voluntary programs, including some of the features of Performance Track, 
"can complement regulatory approaches to accelerate environmental 
improvements" and that EPA should continue to experiment with such 
programs. 171 The report gave four conditions for successful experimentation: 
• Experimentation-including its risks and benefits-must be 
welcomed by legislators and regulators at the federal and state levels, 
environmental NGOs, industry, and academia .... 
165 RAND AsSESSMENT, supra note 9, at iii. The study included a literature review, review of 
Performance Track program documents, and interviews and focus groups with EPA staff, 
environmental groups, state regulators, academics and Performance Track members. Id at xiv. 
166 Id at 2. 
167 Id at 83-84. 
168 Id at 85-87. 
169 Id at 88. 
170 Id at 86. 
171 Id at 88-89. 
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• Experimentation should be viewed as long term, since individual 
efforts take years to initiate and to produce data that can be analyzed. 
• Experimental programs should be developed and operated openly 
and transparently so that all stakeholders are aware of and discuss 
key program features .... 
• Regular program evaluations should be conducted, and programs 
should be modified or terminated if evaluations or other analyses 
determine that they are not working. 172 
The most recent extensive study of the Performance Track program, by 
Cary Coglianese and Jennifer Nash, concluded that the program did not have 
mechanisms to verify that members were top environmental performers, nor 
did the program deliver additional environmental benefits. 173 Additional 
conclusions were: 1) Performance Track attracted facilities that valued 
recognition and actively sought to engage with regulators and their 
communities, and therefore Performance Track was not producing actions 
different than those companies would have done without Performance 
Track; and 2) companies did not think that voluntary programs with high 
goals and standards were worth the cost. 11• This last point is particularly 
noteworthy because the study found that regulatory incentives such as 
fewer inspections and shorter processing times were not significant enough 
to offset the perceived costs to meet higher standards, and are inherently 
limited by the different ways EPA and facility managers value the costs and 
benefits of voluntary programs.175 Finally, the authors concluded that 
voluntary programs will likely never deliver more than "modest additions to 
core regulatory activities."176 
C. Comparative Analysis 
As explained above, the EMAS program has continued to evaluate ways 
to develop and improve the program, consistent with the RAND Assessment 
recommendations for successful implementation of experimental programs 
and the EMS continuous improvement cycle described above. The EMAS 
requirements for public disclosure, legal compliance audits, and reports on 
six core environmental indicators to provide a basis for comparing 
performance could address the concerns about Performance Track's poor 
172 Id at 89. 
173 Coglianese & Nash, Perfonnance Track's Postmortem, supra note 14, at 82--83. 
174 Id at 82-83. 
175 Id at 83. 
176 Id 
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compliance records, and the program's failure to clearly and consistently 
articulate its goals. 111 
Another important difference between EMAS and Performance Track is 
the European Commission's endorsement of the EMAS program and the 
value of environmental management systems, including European 
Commission participation in the EMAS program itself and public disclosure 
of the results of its participation. 178 While successive presidents have ordered 
all fed~ral agencies to incorporate EMSs into their operations-a clear 
acknowledgement of their value-there never was any pronouncement· 
endorsing Performance Track throughout the federal government. 179 
The EMAS studies also found "[p]ersuasive evidence ... for a number 
of benefits arising from EMAS registration, including reduced costs for raw 
materials and waste management, achieving regulatory compliance, 
competitive advantage, regulatory relief (manufacturing sector) and 
improved personnel motivation, "180 and significant decreases in negative 
environmental incidents. 181 This latter finding is particularly noteworthy for 
environmental protection and was not mentioned in any of the Performance 
Track evaluations.182 In fact, the Coglianese and Nash article states that an 
analysis by a consulting firm retained by the authors found that Performance 
Track facilities had a "slightly higher-than-average risk to public health" 
when compared to all facilities required to submit reports under EPA's toxic 
release regulations. 183 That finding is interesting in light of the EMAS studies 
showing that EMAS produced better risk management. 184 Therefore, there 
could be an additional benefit from having facilities like these participate in 
a program like EMAS. 
In contrast, OIG's report and the Coglianese and Nash article 
questioned the positive results reported by the Performance Track 
177 See supra Part IV.B. The RAND Assessment noted concerns about the reliability of 
facility compliance records. RAND AsSESSMENT, supra note 9, at 55. The report stated that 
regulators at all levels confinned that EPA databases to not always reflect facility compliance 
status as recorded by the states who· conduct the inspections, and that EPA has "large-scale, 
systemic, federal-state data-entry and data-sharing problems" which "created an ongoing public-
relations problem for Performance Track" Id Operational issues also complicated the 
Performance Track program's relationship with EPA's Office of Compliance and Enforcement. 
Id at 73. 
178 Eur. Comm'n, What is EMAS, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/emas/index_ 
en.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2016). 
179 See supra Part m.B. 
180 JAN VERNON ET AL., supra note 137, at 18. 
181 Id at 92-93; Iraldo Presentation, supra note 25, at 6. The extent to which insurance 
companies incorporate the existence of having an EMS would be one way to ascertain this 
value. However, insurance companies have been reluctant to disclose such information, stating 
that it is hard to extract one factor from their charges for policies. 
182 In fact, the 2009 study of EMAS was not mentioned in either the RAND Assessment or 
the Coglianese and Nash article. 
183 Coglianese & Nash, Performance Track's Postmortem, supra note 14, at 82. 
184 JAN VERNON ET AL., supra note 137, at 92-93. 
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program. 185 The article highlighted findings in OIG's report that some 
Performance Track members had more toxic emissions than the average for 
their sectors and some had "non-trivial compliance problems. "185 The authors 
also concluded that the program might not have delivered the claimed 
environmental benefits because some members who joined were already 
involved in efforts that would deliver those benefits.187 OIG, however, found 
that "most [Performance Track] members outperformed their sectors for 
_compliance and toxic releases."188 Additionally it noted that "[t]he presence 
of underperforming facilities reduce[d] the integrity and value of the 
Performance Track brand. "189 
The conclusion drawn in the Coglianese and Nash article, that the 
program could not demonstrate it attracted "top performers" rather than 
"extroverts" for membership is particularly jnteresting. 190 The authors state 
that Performance Track members had top-level management support, a 
higher level of support for internal environmental activities, were more 
interested in opinions from communities and environmental groups, and 
valued government recognition more than their competitors who did not 
apply to join Performance Track. 191 Yet none of these factors were deemed 
relevant to superior environmental performance; instead, they were 
considered factors that made them extroverts. 192 The RAND Assessment, 
however, found: 
l85 OIG PERFORMANCE TRACK REPORT, supra note 123, at 19; Coglianese & Nash, 
Perfonnance Track's Postmortem, supra note 14, at 36 (noting that despite "EPA's claims that 
Performance Track recognized top performers and helped spur environmental results, voices 
within the environmental community and within the agency itself began to raise questions at 
least as early as five years into the program's operation"). 
186 Coglianese & Nash, Perfonnance Track's Postmortem, supra note 14, at 81-82. The 
article also states that an analysis by a consulting firm retained by the authors found that 
Performance Track facilities had a "slightly higher-than-average risk to public health" when 
compared to all facilities required to submit reports under EPA's toxic release regulations. Id at 
82. It is not clear from the article how that risk was measured. However, that finding is 
interesting in light of the EMAS studies showing that EMAS produced better risk management. 
See, e.g., lraldo Presentation, supra note 25, at 6, 11-12. Therefore, there could be an additional 
benefit from having these facilities participate in a program like EMAS. 
187 Coglianese & Nash, Perfonnance Track's Postmortem, supra note 14, at 82. See also 
RAND AsSESSMENT, supra note 9, at 46 ("[N]one of these options [benchmarking, continuous 
improvement, or transaction-based], on its own, provides information about whether a facility's 
improvement in performance was caused by its participation in the program. In other words, 
none of these approaches provides a framework for determining a facility's performance but for 
its participation in the program."). 
188 OIG REPORT, supra note 123, at 24. 
189 Id at 23. 
190 Coglianese & Nash, Perfonnance Track's Postmortem, supra note 14, at 81-82. 
191 Id at 61. The management support may have come from foreign parent corporations 
because implementation of EMSs in the United States were initially spurred by multinational 
corporations headquartered outside the United States. Magali A. Delmas, Barriers and 
Incentives to the Adoption of ISO 14001 by Finns in the United States, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & 
POL'Y F. 1, 19 (2000). 
192 Coglianese & Nash, Perfonnance Track's Postmortem. supra note 14, at 61, 82. 
2016] A TALE OF TWO CONTINENTS 839 
A broad range of state and federal regulators, environmental NGOs, and 
members felt that [voluntary programs] provide an effective way to improve 
the flow of information and create new relationships among facilities and 
between regulated facilities and regulators. Stakeholders uniformly felt that 
[voluntary programs] should supplement more-traditional regulatory 
approaches by identifying and sharing information with firms and facilities to 
help them improve their environmental performance. 193 
The RAND Assessment finding is consistent with the several benefits EMS 
disclosures can provide, as described in Part Il.C.194 
The Coglianese and Nash article did note that the comparable non-
Performance Track companies the authors found to compare with the 
Performance Track members (to assess whether the claimed benefits were 
achieved as a result of Performance Track) all had EMSs.195 The fact that all 
these comparable companies that had compliance records similar to 
Performance Track also had EMSs is further evidence that EMSs may play 
an important role is achieving good compliance. 
The studies of both EMAS and Performance Track did have some 
similar findings. The lack of program recognition was a main factor for 
organizations deciding not to participate in both programs. 196 Another finding 
similar to both programs was a concern about the cost of implementing the 
requirements of each program, 197 although in the 2009 EMAS study 22% of 
those who withdrew said that the cost was not a factor. 198 
One further finding in the Coglianese and Nash article is that there is an 
inverse relationship between the rewards a governmental program can offer 
and participation in a voluntary program because of the additional 
193 RAND AsSESSMENT, supra note 9, at 89. 
194 In fact, because the Coglianese and Nash study indicates there may be no recognizable 
benefit to being an extrovert it raises the question whether companies should invest in the 
"extrovert" activities identified, such as top level management support for environmental 
initiatives, additional environmental personnel or governmental and community relations. See 
Coglianese & Nash, Perfonnance Track's Postmortem, supra note 14, at 55-56, 82-83. 
195 Coglianese & Nash, Perfonnance Track's Postmortem, supra note 14, at 52. Some were 
third-party verified, some were not. Id at 52 n.359. 
196 JAN VERNON ET AL., supra note 137, at 91, 97 (this study identified external barriers 
including a lack of market recognition of the EMAS logo and lack of recognition by public 
institutions as key barriers to EMAS registration); see also Jonathan C. Borek & Cary 
Coglianese, Beyond Compliance: Explaining Business Participation in Voluntary Environmental 
Programs, in EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS RESPONSES TO REGULATION 139--41 (Christine 
Parker & Vibike Lehmann Nielsen eds., 2011) (describing how voluntary programs for 
environmental protection like Performance Track offered positive benefits, such as forms of 
public recognition, and explaining motivations that encourage businesses to engage in beyond 
compliance behavior and take voluntary environmental action). 
197 JAN VERNON ET AL., supra note 137, at 91; Coglianese & Nash, Perfonnance Track's 
Postmortem, supra note 14, at 21 ("Managers of facilities in the program raised concerns about 
the costs of participation and about EPA's failure to deliver promised benefits."). 
198 JAN VERNON ET AL., supra note 137, at 33. 
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requirements needed to justify the rewards, 199 has not been addressed in the 
EMAS studies. 
Because the Performance Track program was never given the 
opportunity to address the concerns raised and incorporate the suggestions 
made by OIG and the RAND Assessment, the United States lost the 
opportunity to make changes to address criticisms and to evaluate the 
potential for such programs at the federal level. 200 This is especially 
significant given the inability of the United States government to enact any 
new environmental legislation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
There is clearly a difference between the adoption of EMSs by facilities 
and organizations in Europe and the United States that goes beyond the 
European Union's commitment to its EMAS program compared with the 
withdrawal of Performance Track in the United States. The number of 
certified ISO 14001 EMSs in the European Union is currently about eighteen 
times the number in the United States, and that ratio has not been less than 
about nine times more certifications since 2006.201 In fact, many facilities 
with EMSs in the United States are multinational corporations with their 
headquarters located abroad, 202 demonstrating an even greater difference 
between EMS implementation by American companies compared to their 
foreign counterparts. 
A few reasons have been suggested as the underlying cause for this 
difference. In one study on cross-national variations in the adoption of EMSs 
by companies, the authors studied the response of firms in the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and Germany to EMAS and ISO 14001.203 In the United 
States and Germany, the relationship between the environmental regulators 
and the industries is considered adversarial, due to their command-and-
control policies as well as the presence of politically strong environmental 
movements. 204 In comparison, British environmental regulation is for the 
199 Coglianese & Nash, Perfonnance Track's Postmortem, supra note 14, at 70, 83. 
200 RAND AsSESSMENT, supra note 9, at 3. 
201 2015ISO SURVEY DATA, supra note 56 (compare numbers from European Union countries 
on "ISO 14001 Europe" sheet with the numbers from the United States on "ISO 14001 America" 
sheet). The population difference does not explain this multiple because the number of people 
in the European Union was about 1.6 times larger than in the United States in 2015. World Bank, 
Population, total, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=US-EU (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2016). In addition, the per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the 
European Union was 0.67% of the per capita GDP in the United States. World Bank, GDP per 
capita, PPP (cunent intemational $), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD 
?locations= US-EU (last visited on Nov. 19, 2016) 
202 Delmas, supra note 191, at 19. 
203 Kelly Kollman & Aseem Prakash, Green by Choice? Cross-National Variations in Finns' 
Responses to EMS-Based Environmental Regimes, 53 WORLD POL. 399 (2001) 
204 Id at 416-19. In fact, German legislators initially "borrowed heavily form the American 
model." Id at 419. The RAND Assessment noted that stakeholders reasons for objecting to 
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most part locally based rather than nationally based. 205 Companies negotiate 
operating permits with local authorities who are legally authorized to take 
local environmental and economic conditions into account and who seldom 
take violators to court. 206 
Yet, uptake of EMAS in Germany and ISO 14001 in the United Kingdom 
is high, but low in the United States, so adversarial environmental regulation 
does not explain the difference. 201 The authors of the study concluded that 
Germany's passage of detailed laws to implement EMAS in Germany, using 
EMAS "like a command-and-control instrument designed to oversee and 
measure firm environmental performance," facilitated the growth of EMAS 
and ISO 14001.208 In the United States, however, the public's ability to 
challenge governmental actions in court creates substantive uncertainty 
about whether a regulation will be upheld and enforced, and creates fears of 
expensive litigation that affect the willingness of companies to implement 
EMSs.209 This difference may provide an explanation and helpful insight into 
the current situation, but should not deter efforts to overcome those hurdles 
considering the benefits EMSs can produce. 
To address today's environmental challenges more effectively, we need 
to move beyond environmental protection to sustainability. 210 Although 
command-and-control regulation has achieved many significant 
improvements, more recently it has been found to be "too costly, overly-
prescriptive and, in some instances, ineffective."211 Moreover, 
"[s]ustainability initiatives tend to be characterized by innovation, 
adaptability, continuous change, and systematic thinking, and these are not 
always easy to harmonize with a statutorily driven, top-down regulatory 
regulatory flexibility and broadly-based recognition programs included that "[r]egulators should 
avoid or carefully manage collaborative relationships that could interfere with their 
independence." RAND AsSESSMENT, supra note 9, at 78; see also Delmas, supra note 191, at 29-
30 (noting that as much as United States firms fear potential liability costs from the EMS audits 
under ISO 14001, "it is unclear [as] to what extent the adversarial culture between industry and 
regulatory agencies has actually tempered ... enough to effect a positive shift towards the 
diffusion oflSO 14001 in the U.S."). 
205 Kollman & Prakash, supra note 203, at 420. 
206 Id 
207 Id at 404, 422. 
208 Id at 424. 
209 Id at 427. To satisfy one of the EMS requirements, a firm would need to write its policy 
on environmental matters, which can be regarded as having established a standard to which 
they may be held accountable later. Delmas, supra note 191, at 13-14. On the other hand, if a 
firm disclosed certain information or made detailed the environmental effects of its operations 
in pursuant to ISO 14001, the firm could be opening itself to future litigations-in certain 
contexts "where potential plaintiffs can access this information through a Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) request." Id at 13 & n.60; see also Carr & Thomas, supra note 38, at 111 
n.59, 119 n.82 ("[T]hird parties could remain free to use audit information disclosed to the 
government against a company, e.g., in private tort litigation .... "). 
210 See generally George B. Wyeth & Beth Termini, Regulating for Sustainability, 45 ENVTL. 
L. 663 (2015); John C. Dembach, National Govemance: Still Stumbling Towards Sustainability, 
39 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl L. Inst.) 10,275 (Apr. 2009). 
211 RAND ASSESSMENT, supra note 9, at 6 (referencing studies conducted in the 1990s). 
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system addressing specific issues in a narrowly targeted way."212 The plan-
do-check-act cycle of EMSs provide the perfect platform for the "innovation, 
adaptability, continuous change, and systematic thinking" required for 
sustainability. 213 
Given the inherent range of possible benefits EMSs can provide-from 
interdisciplinary problem solving to systematic assessment and correction-
further research, experimentation, and evaluation are warranted to 
determine which EMS programs to encourage through the enactment of 
reflexive laws. 21• These governmental programs need to establish clear goals 
and concepts before giving significant benefits to regulated entities,215 but 
there can and should be further experimentation to explore the possibilities 
so that everyone can have more confidence once programs are initiated. The 
continuing development and evaluation of EMAS provides important 
additional information and should be examined more closely by EPA. 
Areas of focus suggested by the comparison of EMAS and Performance 
Track include the repeated findings of negative incidence avoidance and risk 
management in the EMAS studies, which are not mentioned in the 
Performance Track studies. In fact, EPA does not recognize either of those 
items as even potential benefits of EMSs on its website.216 
To achieve sustainability and address the significant environmental 
issues like climate change, we also need to explore all forms of contribution 
from all stakeholders, including regulators, industry, communities, and 
NGOs. One possibility for pulling these diverse groups together in a 
constructive way is to investigate options for collaborative governance 
mechanisms. Collaborative governance was an initial cornerstone of 
President Barack Obama's presidency: 
My Administration is committed to creating an unprecedented level of 
openness in Government. We will work together to ensure the public trust and 
establish a system of transparency, public participation, and collaboration. 
Openness will strengthen our democracy and promote efficiency and 
effectiveness in Government. 
Govemment should be collaborative. Collaboration actively engages 
Americans in the work of their Government. Executive departments and 
agencies should use innovative tools, methods, and systems to cooperate 
among themselves, across all levels of Government, and with nonprofit 
212 Wyeth & Termini, supra note 210, at 666. 
213 Id. 
214 Reflexive law is "law that fosters self-regulation." Hirsch, supra note 95, at 1,069. 
215 RAND AsSESSMENT, supra note 9, at 90. 
216 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Leam About Environmental Management Systems, http://www. 
epa.gov/erns/learn-about-environmental-management-systerns#costs (last visited Nov. 19, 2016). 
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organizations, businesses, and individuals in the private sector. Executive 
departments and agencies should solicit public feedback to assess and improve 
their level of collaboration and to identify new opportunities for cooperation.217 
The Collaborative Law movement could be instructive in establishing 
effective forums and processes. This movement was developed in the early 
1990s to overcome the contentious divorce and child custody cases fostered 
by the adversarial process.218 It has transformed the practice of family law.219 
Given the often adversarial relationships among regulators, regulated 
facilities, communities, and environmental NGOs, it is worth investigating 
the Collaborative Law process for ways to move towards sustainability. 
Another important question raised by the comparison of the EMAS and 
Performance Track studies is what value extroverts have in the 
environmental arena. Because EMSs require the collection of a significant 
amount of information about environmental operations and governmentally 
sponsored programs like EMAS integrate the development of that 
information with disclosure requirements, they could provide a platform for 
implementing collaborative environmental governance to address the many 
significant issues we face. As the RAND Assessment concluded, 
"[e]xperimental programs should be developed and operated openly" with 
the participation of all stakeholders.220 
Other important questions include: 1) how large an EMAS or 
Performance Track program should be; and 2) whether it should be 
inclusive, to encourage as many facilities to join as possible, or exclusive, to 
recognize top performers who may provide leadership and important 
innovations. 221 The answer to those questions will require further research. 
The lack of answers, however, should not deter governments from moving 
forward with program development, especially in light of emerging research 
. that "a regulatory scheme can be designed to exploit certification," and 
when combined with traditional enforcement mechanisms "can lead to 
substantially greater environmental performance. "222 
EMSs have the potential for delivering significant and continuing value. 
The United States should revisit voluntary programs like Performance 
Track, utilizing the information developed by EMAS and other governmental 
EMS-based programs around the world. 
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